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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the impact of local banks and digital financial inclu-
sion on Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) financing constraints. 
Using data from Chinese SMEs for the period 2007–2017, our robust results 
find that (1) SMEs’ financing constraints are negatively associated with the 
proportion of local bank branches and the degree of digital financial inclu-
sion; (2) the effect of local banks is more pronounced for firms which are 
small, transparent, and located in the regions less dependent on bank credit; 
and (3) local bank branches and digital financial inclusion have a substitution 
effect on alleviating SMEs’ financial constraints. The findings shed light on 
how digital finance technologies could influence traditional SME-bank rela-
tionships and have important policy and managerial implications.
KEYWORDS 




Rapid development in new financial technologies such as online banking and digital payments has 
intensified the competition between large nationwide banks and small local banks, and affected bank 
credit availabilities for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). Empirical evidence generally 
supports the idea that small local banks have comparative advantages in lending to SMEs (DeYoung 
2002), because they are scattered around all areas, less bureaucratic and more flexible. These char-
acteristics minimize information asymmetry between banks and SMEs (Almazan 2002; Hauswald and 
Marquez 2006) and build up a long-term firm-bank relationship (Agarwal and Hauswald 2010; Berger 
et al. 2005).
In the last 15 years, the Chinese banking sector has been leading in the use of digital finance 
technologies to serve a wide population including vulnerable groups in the UN’s financial inclusion 
strategy. A new concept, digital financial inclusion, has emerged, which is defined as “digital access to, 
and the use of, formal financial services by the excluded and underserved population” (CGAP 2015, 1) 
and could be an active channel for speeding up the process of financial inclusion. However, digital 
financial inclusion could also add more advantages to large nationwide banks in competition with 
local banks in providing finance to SMEs. Nevertheless, little evidence is found in the literature about 
the effect of digital financial inclusion on SME financing through local banks and firm-bank 
relationships.
To fill in this knowledge gap, this paper aims to investigate how local banks and digital financial 
inclusion in China affect SME financial constraints. Using a panel data of Chinese SMEs with 11,610 
firm-year observations covering the period 2007–2017, this paper employs a well-established identi-
fication strategy of financial constraints proposed by Ryan, O’Toole, and McCann (2014) to examine 
the sensitivity of firm-level investment to changes in internal fund availability. We find that SMEs 
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located in areas with a significant proportion of local bank branches or a higher degree of digital 
financial inclusion have fewer financial constraints. The findings conclude that local banks and digital 
financial inclusion play positive and significant roles in reducing SME financing constraints. We 
further assess the interactive impact of local bank branch and digital financial inclusion on SME 
financing constraints and the results show that local bank branch and digital financial inclusion have 
substitution effects on alleviating SMEs’ financial constraints, which might indirectly prove, under the 
development of digital financial inclusion, that large nationwide banks can effectively participate in 
competition with local banks in serving SMEs. Therefore, the traditional dominant market for small 
local banks to help SMEs could shrink, and consequently, the SME-bank relationship could be 
changed. We argue that the findings may have implications for other transition economies (e.g., 
Vietnam) as they share this unique banking composition, i.e., large state-owned banks with nation-
wide branch networks and small local banks which are restricted to operating locally.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the theoretical reasoning used to 
formulate testable hypotheses. Section 3 presents datasets, variables and empirical models. Section 4 
discusses the main results. Section 5 makes conclusions and clarifies the contributions of this study.
2. Theoretical Reasoning
2.1. Local Banks and SME Financing Constraints
SMEs are more dependent on the external financing supplied by commercial banks (Berger and Udell 
1998) because most of them are not qualified to raise money from the stock market. However, 
informational opacity and a lack of audited financial statements are two typical characteristics of 
SMEs (Hasan et al. 2017), which results in SMEs facing more financing constraints than large firms. 
Besides, the credit application process in large banks is highly bureaucratic and mainly based on 
“hard” transaction lending (i.e., asset-based and financial statement lending). Thus, traditionally, large 
banks focus on more substantial scale lending to larger firms (Berger et al. 2005), while discriminating 
against SMEs in lending as most SMEs are privately owned, located in small towns and villages, and 
require frequent loans of small amounts (Cousin 2007; Cull and Xu 2005).
In contrast, small local banks have comparative advantages in forming relationships with local 
borrowers compared to their larger counterparts (DeYoung 2002). Relationship lending is based 
mainly on “soft” information gathered through continuous contacts with firms in the provision of 
financial services (Wu, Song, and Zeng 2008). In other words, small local banks have a “shorter” 
distance to SME clients and can interact with them more frequently than larger banks (Uchida, Udell, 
and Watanabe 2008). As a result, local banks can promptly familiarize SME clients’ financial positions, 
closely monitor their operations, and provide professional services accordingly (Atanassov 2015). 
Furthermore, due to less bureaucracy and operating more locally, capable local banks can offer better 
lending terms to SMEs. Thus, SMEs can enjoy lower bank loan interest rates and pledge fewer assets 
for loans, which could help reduce SMEs’ financing constraints and lead to the possibility of establish-
ing a long-term relationship (Berger et al. 2005; Hasan et al. 2017). This healthy relationship would 
encourage local banks to invest more in information acquisition to further reduce informational 
asymmetries between banks and SMEs (Hadlock and James 2002).
In line with the above-mentioned reasoning, the first hypothesis (H1) can be expressed as: 
H1: Local banks are conducive to alleviating financing constraints for SMEs.
2.2. Digital Financial Inclusion and SME Financing Constraints
In the last decade, FinTech (Financial Technology), broadly known as digital finance, has become more 
and more popular in delivering innovative financial products and services through the internet, PCs, 
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mobiles and contactless cards linking to digital payment systems (Manyika et al. 2016), which have 
introduced novel ways of communication and interaction between lenders and borrowers (Gomber, 
Koch, and Siering 2017). Digital finance refers to “all products, services, technology and/or infrastruc-
ture that enable individuals and companies to have access to payments, savings, and credit facilities via 
the internet (online) without the need to visit a bank branch or to deal directly with the financial service 
provider” (Ozili 2018, 330). The definition clearly suggests that digital finance is a revolution currently 
taking place in the lending environment, and specifically, the context of financial inclusion.
Digital finance can bring substantial benefits to the firm-bank relationship (Ozili 2018). Digital 
finance enables banks and financial institutions to significantly enlarge their client numbers and 
diversify/increase their financial products and services without the need of investing proportionately 
in branches and staff. In other words, the banking sector’s long-term performance would be improved 
from the promotion of digital finance. Moreover, through a digital transaction platform, firms and 
individuals can access broad, diversified, affordable, convenient banking and other services provided 
by banks, financial institutions, and even non-financial sectors.
Given that digital finance can bring benefits to banks/financial institutions and firms/individuals, 
digital financial inclusion is particularly suitable for SME financing. For example, through digital 
transaction platforms, applying for and obtaining loans is much more accessible than before. In the 
environment of digital financial inclusion, the problem of geographical “distance” between banks and 
SMEs can be effectively overcome. Meanwhile, with the application of big data technology, the 
information asymmetry between banks and SMEs can be significantly reduced. Furthermore, with 
the development of digital financial inclusion, the costs of the banking sector are substantially lower 
than before, which allows banks/financial institutions to provide more products and services specially 
designed to suit the needs of SMEs (Ozili 2018).
Besides, when large nationwide banks (state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial 
banks, and postal savings banks) and small local banks (city commercial banks, rural cooperative 
financial institutions, and village and township banks) compete in the market of digital financial 
inclusion, large banks are in a better position than their smaller counterparts not only because they 
have the advantages of capital, experience and talent, but also because they can attract major suppliers 
of digital financial services. In China, Alipay and WeChat Pay prefer, for example, to cooperate with 
large nationwide banks than small local banks. This fact means a significant increase in the lending 
amounts available to SMEs who are traditionally ignored by large banks.
Following this line of arguing, the second hypothesis (H2) can be presented as: 




As our focus is SME financing constraints, we collect sample data from the over-the-counter (OTC) 
market in China.1 The OTC market is an equity trading market which provides financing for 
companies that have not met the public listing requirements for the Main Board Market, either 
because their financial disclosure standards are lower, or their trading volumes are smaller. It has thus 
become a vital financing venue for numerous privately-owned SMEs, such as entrepreneurial and 
high-tech companies, because they face challenges in obtaining loans from banks and consequently 
increasing barriers.
A firm dataset is constructed using the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR, 
http://cn.gtadata.com/) database containing general and financial information based on standardized 
financial statements and records for listed companies, including the firms in the OTC market.2 We 
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collect sample data from CSMAR, provincial bank data from Regional Financial Operation Reports 
published by the People’s Bank of China, provincial digital financial inclusion data from Peking 
University Digital Inclusive Finance Index published by the Digital Finance Research Center of Peking 
University (Guo et al. 2020), and province-level data on macroeconomic items from the China 
Statistical Yearbook issued by the National Bureau of Statistics of China.3
The initial sample includes all firms in the OTC market over the period 2007–2017.4 After 
excluding those firm-year observations with missing values, financial firms and firms located in the 
province of Tibet due to its abnormal macroeconomic information, the final sample consists of 11,610 
firm-year observations.
3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Measuring Financing Constraints
We measure financing constraints following the approach proposed by Fazzari, Hubbard, and 
Petersen (1988), who argue that firms with financing constraints are those whose investment is highly 
sensitive to the availability of internal financing. To be specific, firms with financing constraints find it 
difficult to obtain external funding; as such, investment in such firms relies heavily on internal funds. 
We follow an improved method as described in Ryan, O’Toole, and McCann (2014). The regression 
model (1) is set to evaluate financing constraints as: 
Investmentijk;t ¼ α0 þ α1Cashijk;t  1 þ ε (1) 
where the dependent variable is Investment, and the explanatory variable is Cash. Representing firm i’s 
fixed asset investment, Investment is equal to the net accumulation of fixed assets (accounting for 
depreciation, amortization and/or revaluations) for firm i in sector j and province k in year t, 
normalized by firm i’s fixed assets at the beginning of the year. Cash represents firm i’s cash stock, 
equaling the value of the balance of cash and cash equivalents for firm i in sector j and province k, 
normalized by firm i’s capital stock. To avoid endogeneity problems caused by potential reverse 
causality, Cash is lagged by one period in model (1). If the coefficient of Cash is statistically positive 
(i.e., α1 > 0), it indicates that a positive sensitivity of investment to cash, which means that the firm 
would have financing constraints.
3.2.2. Local Bank Branches and Digital Financial Inclusion
We set a variable Branch% as an indicator of the percentage of local bank branches of total bank 
branches, which equals the proportion of local bank branches in all bank branches across the 
provinces. The higher the Branch% value is, the greater the extent of the local bank presence. If 
smaller cash-investment sensitivity among firms in country-years where local banks have higher 
market share can be observed, it would suggest local banks are conducive to alleviating financing 
constraints for SMEs; thus, H1 can be confirmed,
The variable digital financial inclusion, DIG, is the natural logarithm of the degree of digital 
financial inclusion index for province k at year t. The digital inclusive finance index is designed and 
measured by the Digital Finance Research Center of Peking University, which uses the massive data on 
inclusive digital finance from Ant Financial Services Group.5 The index includes three dimensions, 11- 
second indexes and 33-specific indexes.6 Their calculation methods are based on the calculation 
methods for human development indexes (Bhanojirao 1991) and use logarithmic efficiency functions 
to consolidate the three dimensions into a comprehensive index.
DIG represents the level of digital financial services, and the higher the index is, the greater the 
development of digital financial services in the region would be. If we observe smaller cash-investment 
sensitivity among firms in country-years where digital financial inclusion index is higher, it suggests 
that the development of digital financial inclusion is beneficial for reducing financing constraints for 
SMEs (H2).
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3.2.3. Control Variables
To avoid heterogeneity, we use a set of firm-level and province-level control variables following several 
relevant studies about SME financing constraints and external financing (see Hasan et al. 2017; Laeven 
2003; Petersen and Rajan 1994; Rice and Strahan 2010).
Considering that revenue does not only affect firms’ cash holding position but also influences the 
resources that they can use for investment (Bond and Meghir 1994), we add a variable Sale to model 
(1), which is the ratio of sales to total asset for firm i. As firm size can affect the availability of bank 
loan, e.g., banks are reluctant to lend to small firms because they are more opaque in terms of 
information and have a higher operation risk, we use Asset to represent the size of the firm, which 
is the natural logarithm of firm assets. Growth is firm i’s growth ability measured by its growth rate of 
revenue. The firms with high growth trend suggest that they have more investment opportunities.
Meanwhile, ROA is firm i’s profitability, measured by its ratio of net profit to total asset. When 
firms have investment opportunities that potentially get returns, they will increase investment. LEV is 
firm i’s financial leverage measured by its ratio of total debt to total asset. High financial leverage 
suggests a firm has a high proportion of debts which would decrease the likelihood that the firm would 
receive further loans from banks for investment. Age is firm i’s establishment period, which is the 
natural logarithm of firm age. The firm age can affect firm investment because firms at different stages 
have different investment preferences. For instance, younger firms are likely to invest more, while 
older ones are expected to hold or take back their investments.
Besides firm-level control variables, we also control for some variables at a provincial level including 
the natural logarithm of regional gross domestic product (GDP), representing the degree of economic 
development, the regional gross domestic product growth rate (GDPgrowth), the proportion of the 
government’s financial expenditure on regional GDP (Gov Expenditure), and the degree of inflation in 
each province (CPI), because these factors might influence firms’ investment behavior or financing 
constraints directly or indirectly. Table 1 provides a statistics summary of our main variables.
3.3. Empirical Model
Based on the model (1), to measure SME financing constraints, we add banking market structure 
(Branch%) and index of digital financial inclusion (DIG) in province k and control variables for 
controlling the characteristics of firm i, sector j, province k and year t. The empirical model is 
Investmentit ¼ β0 þ β1Saleijk;t  1 þ β2Cashijk;t  1 þ β3Branch%kt
þ β4Cashijk;t  1 � Branch%kt þ β5DIGkt þ β6Cashijk;t  1
� DIGkt þ θijkt þ γPkt þ ρKk þ ωIj þ φYt þ εijkt
(2) 
Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variables N Mean Median St. Dev. p5 p25 p75 p95
Investment 11610 1.015 −0.016 18.004 −0.373 −0.104 0.257 2.667
Cash 11610 0.634 0.379 1.057 0.022 0.147 0.785 1.988
Branch% 11610 0.364 0.385 0.101 0.200 0.245 0.457 0.511
DIG 11610 5.492 5.502 0.200 5.123 5.397 5.622 5.799
Sale 11610 0.784 0.676 0.593 0.161 0.448 0.984 1.702
Asset 11610 18.333 18.378 1.118 16.458 17.583 19.101 20.029
Growth 11610 0.368 0.144 1.768 −0.207 0.001 0.400 1.342
ROA 11610 0.010 0.041 1.268 −0.235 −0.011 0.098 0.216
LEV 11610 0.406 0.377 1.601 0.070 0.222 0.533 0.749
Age 11610 2.261 2.303 0.469 1.386 1.946 2.639 2.944
GDP 11610 10.449 10.311 0.641 9.579 10.044 11.124 11.361
GDPgrowth 11610 0.077 0.077 0.014 0.066 0.069 0.081 0.096
Gov Expenditure 11610 0.201 0.195 0.079 0.127 0.148 0.244 0.268
CPI 11610 0.019 0.017 0.006 0.012 0.015 0.021 0.032
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where Fijkt, Pkt, Kk, Ij, and Yt are vectors of firm controls, province controls, province dummies, industry 
dummies and year dummies, respectively. Base on the analysis in the theoretical reasoning, we expect that 
local banks and digital financial inclusion can alleviate SME financing constraints and reduce the sensitivity 
between investment and cash, i.e., β4 < 0 and β6 < 0.
To avoid endogeneity problems caused by potential reverse causality running from the dependent 
variable to the explanatory variables, Sale, Cash, Asset, Lev, Growth, and ROA are lagged by one period. 
Meantime, to avoid the potential measurement error of investment resources, we use GMM (the 
generalized method of moments) estimation, instrumenting for Sale using the second and third lagged 
values of Sale.
4. Results and Discussions
4.1. Main Results
Table 2 shows the main findings from the baseline analysis for firm investment estimated by two- 
stage GMM. In the column (1), the coefficient of cash stock (Cash) is positive and significant at 1% 
level, implying that firms’ investment is sensitive to the availability of internal funds. Specifically, 
an increase in Cash of 1% is on average associated with 0.21% increase in Investment. We interpret 
the result as SMEs relying on internal financing to invest in projects, suggesting the firms in our 
sample have financing constraints. The result is consistent with those of Ding, Guariglia, and 
Knight (2013) and Howell (2016), who reported that SMEs face a severe funding shortage in 
China.
In column (2), the share of local bank branches in the province (Branch%) and the interaction 
between the percentage of local bank branches and cash stock (Cash×Branch%) are added. The result 
indicates the coefficient of Branch% is not significant, meaning the numbers of local bank branches are 
insignificant in affecting SMEs’ investment. However, we find the interaction variable (Cash×Branch 
%) is negative and significant at 1% level, suggesting that the proportion of SME funds received from 
local bank branches can effectively reduce the SMEs’ financial constraints. Moreover, considering that 
the impact of local bank branches on the local economy is significant, we move the share of local bank 
branches from 5% to 95% percentile and observe that the sensitivity of investment to cash decreases 
from 0.074 (0.117–0.217 × 20%) to 0.006 (0.117–0.217 × 51%). The finding supports the results in 
DeYoung (2002), as well as Hauswald and Marquez (2006), who argue that local small banks have 
a comparative advantage in providing financing to SMEs because the degree of information asym-
metry is lower between SMEs and local banks. Therefore, SMEs are more likely to ease financing 
constraints through bank credit in the regions with a high local bank presence.
In column (3), the digital financial inclusion index (DIG) and the interaction between the digital 
financial inclusion index and cash stock (Cash×DIG) are added. The coefficient of DIG is not 
significant, which means the availability of digital financial inclusion cannot automatically bring 
benefits to SMEs’ investment. However, the interaction variable DIG×Cash is negative and highly 
significant, suggesting that the level to which SMEs use digital financial inclusion can reduce financial 
constraints. To evaluate its economic significance for the relationship, if the province in which firms 
are located move from 5% to 95% percentile of digital financial inclusion, we can observe the 
sensitivity of investment to cash is shifted from 0.059 (0.515–0.089 × 5.12) to −0.0012 (0.515– 
0.089 × 5.80). This result confirms Hypothesis 2, concluding that the development of digital financial 
inclusion is conducive to alleviating financing constraints for SMEs. The findings are consistent with 
that of Chauvet and Jacolin (2017), who found that financial inclusion reduces the “financing gap” 
facing SMEs and encourages investment activities.
Finally, in column (4), we add Branch%, Cash×Branch%, DIG, Cash×DIG, Branch%×DIG and 
Cash×Branch%×DIG in the regression model. The interaction variable Cash×Branch%×DIG is sig-
nificantly positive. In contrast, the signs of the other variables have not changed, implying that local 
banks and digital financial inclusion play substitution roles in alleviating SME financing constraints. 
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The finding suggests that the local banks are conducive to alleviating SME financing constraints; 
however, with the development of digital financial inclusion, the role of local banks has been gradually 
reduced. This might be attributed to the fact that the development of digital financial inclusion could 
enable large and state-owned banks to positively and effectively join the competition in serving SMEs 
because they have the advantages of capital, experience and talent for developing digital technologies 
and cooperating with suppliers of digital financial services. Specifically, this can be explained from 
three perspectives. First, traditionally, compared with small local banks, one of the disadvantages of 
large nationwide banks is that they hardly reach many SMEs located in less developed regions. 
However, digital technologies can overcome the fundamental distance problem through information 
technology, such as electronic exchange systems, online and mobile banking, which can increase SME 
accessibility to the financial services provided by large nationwide banks. Second, large banks can take 
advantage of big data technology to improve SME information opacity and reduce lending risk. Third, 
digital information technologies can help large banks shorten decision-making processes and reduce 
bureaucratic procedures.
To the extent that the omitted variables or measurement errors may cause estimation bias, we 
further perform robustness checks to verify the stability of our baseline results in Table 3. We first 
re-estimate the impact of local banks and digital financial inclusion on SME financing constraints 
by considering the investment-cash flow sensitivity model where the ratio of capital expenditures to 
Table 2. Baseline estimates of the impact of local bank branch and digital financial inclusion on SME financing constraints.
Dep Var: Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
Sale 0.081 0.081 0.082 0.083
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.015)***
Cash 0.021 0.117 0.515 1.788













Asset 0.167 0.165 0.167 0.164
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Growth −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
ROA −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
LEV 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.001)** (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001)**
Age −0.027 −0.027 −0.028 −0.028
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
GDP 0.099 0.088 0.105 0.068
(0.140) (0.143) (0.140) (0.143)
GDPgrowth 0.483 0.524 0.451 0.535
(0.567) (0.572) (0.568) (0.571)
Gov Expenditure 0.225 0.140 0.138 −0.169
(0.631) (0.675) (0.632) (0.683)
CPI −0.800 −1.042 −1.041 −1.593
(1.187) (1.204) (1.198) (1.222)
N 11610 11610 11610 11610
Hansen’s J (P-value) .179 .164 .191 .162
** and ***Signify statistical significance at 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
EMERGING MARKETS FINANCE AND TRADE 7
total assets of firm i in time t is linked to the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets of firm i in 
time t-1. All other variables are similar to those in model (2). We also test the alternative of local 
banks and digital financial inclusion in alleviating SME financing constraints through the bank 
loans held by SMEs. The rationale for doing so is that obtaining bank credits from whatever types of 
banks could ease SME financing constraints. The regression model we consider thus uses the ratio 
of bank loan to total assets of firm i in time t as dependent variable, and all other variables are the 
same as in model (2). The results for both tests with alternative measures confirm and support our 
hypotheses.7
4.2. Heterogeneity Tests
Although the results thus far indicate that local banks and digital financial inclusion can alleviate SME 
financing constraints, there is the possibility of a heterogeneity issue attributed to specific firm 
characteristics. To elaborate, we might expect the effect of local banks and digital financial inclusion 
to be offset or enhanced among firms that are relatively small, opaque and situated in a different 
market environment. We therefore need to address these concerns accordingly.
4.2.1. Firm Size
Table 3 presents the extension results of our empirical model used to test heterogeneous effects across 
categories of firm size. We divide the sample into two groups by the size of SMEs. Small is a dummy 
Table 3. Results of heterogeneous test: small vs. medium firms.
Dep Var: Investment
(1) (2)
































Hansen’s J (P-value) .642 .200
*, **, and ***Signify statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respec-
tively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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variable that equals one if the firm classifies as a small enterprise according to China’s official categories of 
firm sizes, zero otherwise. Small firms are firms with sales of less than 20 million RMB yuan.
In column (1), we estimate the impact of local banks and digital financial inclusion on small firms. 
The interaction variables, Cash×Branch% and Cash×DIG, are negative and significant at 1% level, 
suggesting that the development of local banks and digital financial inclusion can alleviate financing 
constraints for small firms. The result is principally consistent with what we found in the baseline 
regression results. However, in column (2), only the interaction variable Cash×DIG is significantly 
negative, which means digital financial inclusion plays a better role in alleviating financing constraints 
for medium firms than for small firms. The finding suggests that, although the development of local 
banks and digital financial inclusion generally reduces financing constraints for small and medium 
firms, the presence of local banks is more helpful for small firms than medium ones. In contrast, digital 
financial inclusion is more beneficial for medium-sized firms.
4.2.2. Firm Opacity
To test the heterogeneous effects linking to firms’ opacity, we calculate the ratio of firm i’s intangible 
assets to total assets. Following the method of Ryan, O’Toole, and McCann (2014), we set a dummy 
variable Opacity. Opacity equals to one if the firm i’s intangible assets ratio is higher than the median of 
the year, otherwise zero. We lag the variable Opacity by one period to avoid reverse causality between 
investment and the ratio of intangible assets. Table 4 presents the results.
In column (1), we estimate the impact of local banks and digital financial inclusion on opaque 
firms. We find that only the interaction variable Cash×DIG is significantly negative, and the other, 
Cash×Branch%, is not. However, for transparent firms in column (2), Cash×Branch% and Cash×DIG 
are both negative and statistically significant. The results suggest that although the development of 
digital financial inclusion is generally good for all SMEs, local banks are more willing to serve 
transparent firms. This result is in line with the argument of Rajan and Zingales (1995) that tangible 
assets can serve as collateral and diminish the risk for lenders from debt defaults.
4.2.3. Bank Market Power
In this subsection, we test whether the effects of local banks and digital financial inclusion differ 
when the structures of the financial system are different in provinces. Considering that bank credit is 
the most important financing channel for SMEs, we mainly analyze the effect of bank market power 
(proxied by bank credit). We define bank market power here as the share of bank credits in the total 
values of finance in a given province. Generally, the firms in the regions where the primary source of 
external funding is through bank lending are forced to seek bank credit as they have few alternatives. 
Additionally, in the provinces with higher bank market power, the credit market is a seller’s market, 
and banks have ultimate power; in this case, even small local banks may be reluctant to pay extra 
costs to serve SMEs. Therefore, we expect that the effect of local banks and digital financial inclusion 
on SMEs financing constraints should decrease in the provinces that have higher bank market 
power. To measure the bank market power in a region, we follow the studies of Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Feyen, and Levine (2013) and Ryan, O’Toole, and McCann (2014) and define the bank market 
power first: 




where BankCredit is total bank credit of province k in year t; MarketCapitalisation is the total value of 
listed companies’ market capitalization of province k in year t. We set a dummy variable Bankpower 
which takes a value of one if the province’s financial structure is higher than the median of the year, 
meaning the firms in the provinces where the bank credit power is higher.
Table 5 presents the results. For the firms in the provinces where bank market power is lower 
(column (2)), Cash×Branch% and Cash×DIG are all negative and significant at 1% level, which is 
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consistent with the baseline regression results. However, the firms in the provinces where bank credit 
power is higher (column (1)), the interaction term Cash×DIG is not significant, and Cash×Branch% is 
significantly positive, which means (1) the development of local banks and digital financial inclusion is 
not as equally important for alleviating financing constraints for SMEs in the regions with high bank 
market power as in the regions with low bank market power; (2) higher bank market power in a region 
would not help ease SME financing constraints.
5. Conclusion
Using a large data set that includes 11,610 SME firm-year observations over the period 2007–2017, this 
paper analyzes the effect of local bank branches and digital financial inclusion on SME financing 
constraints. We find that there is a relatively high sensitivity of firms’ investment to the availability of 
internal funds, suggesting SMEs face difficulties in obtaining external financing. We find that the 
variation in cash-investment sensitivity is captured by the share of local banks and the development 
of digital financial inclusion. Specifically, both local banks and digital financial inclusion can reduce 
cash-investment sensitivity, which indicates that local banks and digital financial inclusion are conducive 
to alleviating financing constraints for SMEs. Further, we assess the interactive impact of local banks and 
digital financial inclusion on reducing SMEs’ financing constraints, and the results show that local banks 
and digital financial inclusion have a substitution effect on reducing financing constraints for SMEs.
Table 4. Results of heterogeneous test: opaque vs. transparent firms.
Dep Var: Investment
(1) (2)
































Hansen’s J (P-value) .359 .337
*, **, and ***Signify statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respec-
tively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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We also test the heterogeneity in the impact of local banks and digital financial inclusion on 
financing constraints with different firm and regional characteristics. First, we find that the effect of 
local banks on alleviating financial constraints is only significant for small firms. In contrast, the 
impact of digital financial inclusion is significant for both small and medium firms. This might be 
because smaller firms are more dependent than medium firms on obtaining relationship loans from 
local banks. Second, we find local banks are more conducive to transparent firms than their opaque 
counterparts, suggesting opaque firms face more financing constraints. Third, the positive contribu-
tion of local banks and digital financial inclusion in alleviating financial constraints only exists in the 
regions where the financial structure is less dependent on bank credit. It might be because bank market 
power is more extensive in the regions where SME financing is more dependent on bank credit.
The contributions of this paper to the literature are threefold. First, to the best of our knowledge, there is 
no research so far examining the impact of digital financial inclusion on alleviating SME financing 
constraints. As digital financial inclusion is a newly emerging concept which overlaps information technol-
ogy and financial inclusion, the empirical evidence revealed in this paper thus provides interesting insights. 
Second, banking market structure research is generally focused on developed countries, especially in the 
United States (see Berger and Black 2011; Han, Zhang, and Greene 2017). However, in comparison with the 
U.S., banking systems in developing or transitional countries are much more crucial for providing finance to 
SMEs as these countries have less developed capital markets and strict regulatory systems in equity 
financing. China in particular is a unique institutional environment where large, national state-owned 
Table 5. Results of heterogeneous test: regional bank market power.
Dep Var: Investment
(1) (2)
































Hansen’s J (P-value) .574 .079*
*, **, and ***Signify statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Control variables are the 
same as in Table 2.
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banks and small, diversified ownership local banks operate simultaneously. We compute market shares of 
regional banks based on the number of branches within a given province. This approach differs with the 
measurement of bank market share in an open financial market (e.g. Tian and Han 2019). Presumably, it can 
be applied to other emerging countries with similar banking systems, especially to those economies 
transitioning from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Third, the finding that local banks 
and digital financial inclusion are substituted should open a door to research on how digital financial 
inclusion has changed and will change SME-bank relationships; and many questions remain unanswered. 
For example, to what extent large banks and small banks use digital financial technologies differently in 
providing services to SMEs, how and why SMEs respond to them, and how these changes could alter the 
definitions of the concepts of formal and informal lending.
This research has important policy and managerial implications. The Chinese banking sector has 
undergone a dramatic reform in the last 40 years, characterized by banking deregulation and bank 
diversity, and strategically promoted the construction of digital financial inclusion in recent years. Our 
results provide strong evidence suggesting the strategies and policies in banking reform and digital 
financial inclusion have achieved their goals substantially, resulting in the significant contributions of 
local banks and digital financial inclusion to SME funding relief. More importantly, our study high-
lights that the involvement of new digital technologies in financial inclusion might reach a turning 
point for the establishment of new SME-bank relationships – perhaps subtle or intricate. Still, one can 
be certain that these new relationships will add different interpretations to what we understood before 
about the relationships between SMEs and small/large banks. However, our study is limited to a single 
country and in sample numbers. We expect more research to measure the types of banks and the 
degree of digital financial technologies used by different categories of banks and how their relationship 
changes as a result of using digital financial technologies.
Notes
1. Alipay is a third-party online mobile payment system (equivalent to PayPal in China), owned by the leading 
e-commerce giant, Alibaba Group. WeChat Pay is a digital wallet service by WeChat allowing users make mobile 
payments and online transactions.
2. The data that supports the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable 
request.
3. See http://www.pbc.gov.cn/zhengcehuobisi/125207/125227/125960/126049/index.html and http://www.stats. 
gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj.
4. The choice of 2007 as the starting point is due to the fact that in 2006, the Ministry of Finance of China issued new 
accounting standards which introduced fair values in accounting information. As such, there is a significant 
difference in financial information disclosure for listed firms before and after 2006, especially in terms of asset 
and liability measurements.
5. This group is a Fintech platform that serves small and micro enterprises and individual consumers in China.
6. See Appendix A in the Online Supplementary Document.
7. See Appendix B in the Online Supplementary Document.
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